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VOLUME XII MAY, 1943 NUMBER 2
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF PATENTS
FRANK J. WILLEt
ACTING under the powers delegated to him' by the President of the
United States under the First War Powers Act, 1941,2 the Alien
Property Custodian has, as of October 2, 1942, vested "in the interest of
and for the benefit of the United States" some 25,000 patents formerly
owned by nationals of enemy countries, 15,000 patents formerly owned
by nationals of enemy occupied countries, and some 5,500 applications'
for patent of such former ownership. He has announced he will issue
licenses under vested patents for a fee of $50.00 for the first patent in
any one license with an additional $5.00 for each other patent included
in the same license. The licenses are to be royalty free, non-exclusive,
n6n-assignable, and for the life of the patents as to patents vested
from nationals of countries with whom we are at war. As to patents
vested from nationals of enemy occupied countries, the licenses are to
be of the same type with the exception, however, that they are royalty
free only for the duration of the war plus six months, and thereafter
royalty bearing "on the basis of prevailing commercial practice".4 While
the licenses are granted for the life of the patents, they are to be revo-
cable for failure of the licensee to live up to the license agreement,
including the condition that the licensee must make annual reports to
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Exec. Order 9193, 7 Fed. Reg. 5205.
2. 50 U. S. C. A. (App.) § 616, 55 STAT. 839 (1941) amending 50 U. S. C. A. (App.)
§ 5(b), 40 Stat. 966 (1918).
3. These applications for patent are being prosecuted to patents by the Alien Property
Custodian, and many have issued as patents to the Alien Property Custodian at this
writing. Applications for patent impart no right to exclude from making, using, or vending
the invention therein described, and are kept secret by the Patent Office. The inventor
may, even after he is in receipt of a notice of allowance of his application, elect not to
obtain a patent. The validity of patents, prosecuted to grant by the Alien Property
Custodian based upon the applications for patent vested by him, is not free of doubt.
See Chemical Foundation v. General Aniline, 99 F. (2d) 276 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), cert.
denied 305 U. S. 654 (1938).
4. ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODLAN, PATENTS AT WORK-A STATEMENT OF POLICY (January
1943) 14-16.
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the Custodian "covering the volume and value of production under
licensed patents and the research work undertaken in conjunction with
them."5
Patents issued by the United States have in the past been held, and
are now held, in addition to the vested patents, by the federal govern-
ment, or by its officers and department heads on behalf of, or as trustees
for, the United States.6 As a result of the vesting orders above men-
tioned, the federal government, at this writing, holds title to the largest
single block of patents in the United States, relating to a very wide
range of technology.' Nevertheless, no court has ever had before it for
adjudication the effects of the ownership of patents by the federal
governmentY There has, however, been a brief treatment of the ques-
tion in the dissenting opinions of one relatively recent case.9 The federal
courts have held that the federal government has a "shop right"10 under
patents issued to its employees." It has'also been held where the federal
employee was specifically assigned to research problems and in the
course of his work makes an invention, he must assign all rights to the
invention and the patent thereon to the federal government."2
The object of the present paper is to analyze the effects of the owner-
ship of patents by the federal government. Public policy would seem
compellingly to require that an invention, as soon as it is made and dis-
closed, should be available to the public. But the very concept of the
patent, the exclusive right to an invention, is opposed to this. If then,
the federal government, when it holds a patent, has the power to exclude
5. Id. at 15.
6. Reports of Joint Hearings of the Committee on Patents of the Senate and House
of Representatives, 66th Congress, 1st Sess. on S. 3223 and H. 9932, November 5, 1919;
Hearings before the Committee on Patents, House of Representatives, 65th Congress, 3d
Sess. on H. 14944, January 27, 1919.
7. ALIw_ PROPERTY CUSTODAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1.
8. Attorney-General Reed, 38 A. G. Op. 425, 428 (1936).
9. United States v. Dubilier, 289 U. S. 178 (1933).
10. Where a servant, during his hours of employment, working with his master's
materials and apparatus, conceives and perfects an invention for which he obtains a
patent, he must accord his master a non-exclusive right to practice the invention. This
implied license is designated a "shop right", is personal to the master's business and as-
signable therewith, and is for the life of the patent irrespective of the continued employ-
ment of the servant. McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202 (U. S. 1843).
11. Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342 (1890); Gill v. United States, 160 U. S.
426 (1896); Moffett v. Fiske, 51 F. (2d) 868 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied 284 U. S.
662 (1931).
12. United States v. Houghton, 20 F. (2d) 434 (1927), affirmed 23 F. (2d) 386, cert.
denied 277 U. S. 592 (1928).
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the public from the invention disclosed in the patent, such public policy'
would appear not to be served. If, on the contrary, the invention of
such a patent held by the federal government, were dedicated to the
public, such public policy would be served. What are the facts deter-
minative of the question: Does the ownership of a patent by the federal
government result in a dedication of the invention, to which the patent
is directed, to the public of the United States?
The treatment of the question herein is on its broadest basis, it being
wholly immaterial what set of facts brought about the holding by, or
on behalf of, the federal government. Title to the patent may be in the
United States by assignment from a government employee before or
after filing the application for patent, or after issue of the patent, or by
assignment, gift or devise from any one, or by vesting of the patent
under the war power. The assignment or vesting may have been spe-
cifically of the patent, or generally of property of which the patent was
but a part.13
Under the Constitution, our federal government is one of delegated
and enumerated powers, the delegation being, as stated in its preamble,
by "we, the people of the United States". As stated early in our national
history, "there can be no doubt that it was competent to the people to
invest the general government with all the powers they may deem proper
and necessary; to extend or restrain these powers according to their
own good pleasure, and to give them a paramount and supreme author-
ity".' 4 The Tenth Amendment, declaring that "the powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people", is
positive recognition of such delegation,'and appears to have been adopted
to allay for all time the then widespread fear that the federal govern-
ment might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt
to exercise powers which had not been delegated.' In view thereof,
the federal government can claim only the powers granted to it, which
powers must be given either expressly or by necessary implication.
13. Throughout this article the word "vest" and its derivatives have the meaning of
the First War Powers Act, 1941; that is, vesting or seizure "in the interest of and for
the benefit of the United States" [50 U. S. C. A. (App.) § 616 (1)]. It is to be clearly
distinguished from the type of seizure during World War I, under Section 7(c) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, as to which the Alien Property Custodian was given the
powdrs of a common law trustee [50 U. S. C. A. (App.) § 12], and was the custodian
of the property to conserve it, or its equivalent, for the former owners.
14. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheaton 304 (U. S. 1806).
15. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 90 (1907).
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The delegation of power, upon which the patent and copyright statutes
are based, is Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, reading: "The Congress
shall have power .... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
The actual and detailed reasons for the delegated power having this
form are not known, due largely to the agreement of the members of
the Constitutional Convention to keep their proceedings secret at the
time. It is known that the convention observed the procedure of refer-
ring proposals, on which agreement was reached, to a committee. It
appears that the original proposals, out of which the instant constitu-
tional provision developed, were not before the convention until August
18, 1787. On that day, there was agreement on proposals:
"To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time
To encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries
To grant patents for useful inventions
To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time."' 6
These proposals were referred, but whether the Committee of Detail
considered them is unknown. Its report of August 22nd, 1787, on other
proposals submitted simultaneously with these proposals, does not men-
tion them. On August 31, 1787, a Committee of eleven,17 on remaining
matters, was appointed, and on September 5, 1787, Mr. Brearley of this
committee rendered its report. The formulation of this report, "To
promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited
times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries", was agreed to by the convention on that day.
8
With the other matters adopted by the convention, this formulation was
referred to the Committee of style, which reported on September 12,
1787.19 The Constitution, containing the clause unchanged in phrase-
ology was adopted and signed by the delegates on September 17, 1787.2"
No contemporaneous record appears to have been preserved of the
detailed reasons leading to the adoption of this constitutional provision,
16. 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1937) 321-323. See also
Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution (1929) 17
GEORGETOWN L. J. 109, reprinted in 11 JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFF. Soc. 438.
17. 2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 475.
18. Id. at 505.
19. Id. at 591.
20. Id. at 655.
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or of the arguments advanced for or against it in the deliberations of
the convention or in committee. The proposals as sent to the committee
appear to have emphasized the rights of the authors and inventors. In
the constitutional provision, the emphasis appears to be on promoting
science and the useful arts rather than the right and rewards of the
authors and inventors. The primary purpose of the provision has been
held by the courts to be "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts".2 It is submitted, then, that whenever patent rights are being
considered, the primary purpose of the constitutional provision must
always be respected.2" That is, the words of the primary purpose can
never be treated as mere surplusage and lost sight of.
For the one type of right, grantable to individuals, which the framers
dignified by inclusion in the Constitution, it appears significant the words
"the exclusive right" were used. Although one of the proposals, upon
which the constitutional provision was founded, used the word "patents",
the word was discarded. While the reasons for its non-use are not
definitely known, it is not unreasonable to conclude that this is some
evidence of a desire to avoid the use of a word which had also an ob-
noxious meaning to the framers in the course of history as it affected
them.3 Even as to the exclusive right they were prepared to grant, the
framers made certain it would be always beneficial by requiring it "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts".
It is axiomatic that the progress'of science and the useful arts is pro-
moted by the spread of knowledge of advances made therein. Such
knowledge comes from informative and detailed publication of the ad-
vances made, and the more detailed, accurate and precise the publica-
tion, the more is scientific progress promoted. Every government, new
21. Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322 (U. S. 1858); Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 Fed. Cas.
No. 9,173 at 922 (C. C. Cal. 1867); Warner v. Smith, 13 App. D. C. 111 (1898); In re
Mower, 15 App. D. C. 144, 152 (1899), quoted with approval in Woodbridge v. United
States, 263 U. S. 50, 55 (1923); Vanore v. Improta, 25 F. (2d) 918, 923 (App. D. C.
1928); THE CONSTITUTION OF TH UNITED STATES, ANNOTATED (Library of Congress 1938)
236-240.
22. FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS (1942) 97.
23. Fenning (cf. supra n. 16) however, believes that "patent" was not used to avoid
confusion with patents on inventions granted by various of the colonies. Some colonial
patent laws imposed upon the patentee the requirement that he manufacture the patented
articles within the particular colony, while other laws permitted the colonial authorities,
where the inventor did not in their opinion manufacture sufficient of the patented articles
or did not sell the articles at reasonable prices, to grant licenses under the patent to others.
Contemporaneous evidence is against this opinion; see PAncE, PUBLic Goon (1780), a
pamphlet discussing territorial rights under royal "patents" or charters.
1943]
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and old and certainly since the Industrial Revolution, has had, and has,
as one of its primary objects the promotion of science and the useful
arts within its realm. Wherein then can the federal government best fur-
ther the progress of science and the useful arts? lhe mere statement of
the question forcefully compels the answer: by prompt and informative
publication of the advances as they are made so that all may use and
apply the knowledge. In the patent statutes our federal legislators have
placed the emphasis on the disclosure of the discovery or the writing,24
and it is for the disclosure that the patent is granted. As to writings by
the government, the legislators have most correctly expressly enacted
that no copyright exists in the federal government. 25 But as to inven-
tions of the government, our federal legislators have, to date, enacted
no general statute comparable to that on copyrights, but have, rather
recently, authorized one federally incorporated authority to hold patent
rights.2
24. A disclosure, made without the scrutiny of a party other than the person making
the disclosure, is seldom completely understood by others, particularly when the disclosure
involves technical subject matter. The careful scrutiny given by the Examiners of the
United States Patent Office to applications for patent to make certain that the disclosure
is sufficiently full, clear, concise and exact [Rev. Stat. 4888, 35 U. S. C. A. § 33 (1870)],
is recognized universally as making the disclosure of an invention in the U. S. patent
specification outstanding. Thus, in PITZCKER, DAS PATENTGESETZ (Berlin, 1929), the
author, critical of the lack of a corresponding statutory requirement as to clarity and
detail in the German Patent Law, writes (trans. supplied):
"Present conditions [in German patent practice] in which one must call upon the . . .
United States patent specification [corresponding to the German patent] when it becomes
necessary to ascertain what the invention really is, are unbearable." Id. at 303.
25. The Copyright Acts, 17 U. S. C. A. § 7, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909): "7. . . No copy-
right shall subsist in . . . any publication of the United States Government. . . ." See,
however, the exception in respect of black and white reproductions of postage stamps,
39 U. S. C. A. § 371 (1938).
26. By Section 831 d(i) of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U. S. C. A. §§ 831-
831dd (1933) the employees of the T. V. A., assigned to research problems, must assign
their inventions arising out of such research, and the patents thereon, to the T. V. A.
The latter may, out of the income from the sale of licenses under the patent, pay to the
inventor such sum as T. V. A. deems proper. ,
The Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, as amended to 1941, 50 U. S. C. A.
(App.) §§ 1-31, it is submitted, is of no interest on the present inquiry for, while it in-
cluded legislation specific to patents, the provisions relate only to enemy owned patents
seized, and held by the Alien Property Custodian as a trustee and custodian for the
enemy owners.
The First War Powers Act, 1941, 50 U. S. C. A. (App.) §§ 601-622, contemplates not
custodianship to preserve the property of the enemy owners, but confiscation of the vested
property. Patents are not specifically mentioned in the Act but are within its contempla-
tion, as exemplified by Executive Order 9193, 7 Fed. Reg. 5205.
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But do not patent rights promote the progress of science and the use-
ful arts when the rights are owned and exercised by the federal govern-
ment? It seems appropriate to recall, and constantly keep in mind, the
nature of the patent right and the attributes of ownership of a patent,
in answering this question. The patent right is the right, granted by the
federal government, to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention therein described and claimed;2 7 it is never a right to make,
use and sell."' The attributes of its ownership are the right to assign
the patent, the right to grant licenses under the patent, exclusive or non-
exclusive as the owner may see fit, and the right to grant no license to
anyone on any terms even where the owner himself does not practice
the invention disclosed in the patent. 9
Congress does have the express power "to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting . . . . Property belonging to
the United States".30 Hence if the rights under patents survive the
assignment or vesting of the title to patents to the federal government,
Congress may, by general or specific legislation, authorize the executive
branch to dispose of patents owned by the United States by sale, or
lease, or license. Nowhere in the Constitution, and the amendments, is
there any express delegation to the federal government, or to any de-
partment thereof, of the right to exclude others from making, using and
selling any invention which has been disclosed. And there is no rule of
common law recognizing, even in the inventor himself, the right to ex-
clude others from the practice of an invention which has been disclosed.3 1
The right cannot thus be incorporated in the Constitution by reference
to the common law. When the title to a patent is acquired by the fed-
eral government, the right to 'exclude has returned to the authority
granting the right. It is submitted that there is thus a merger, and the
27. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539 (U. S. 1852); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S.
1 (1912) ; Straus v. Victor Talking Machine, 243 U. S. 490 (1916) ; Motion Picture Patents
v. Universal Film, 243 U. S. 502 (1916); Boston Store v. American Graphophone, 246
U. S. 8 (1917).
28, It re Brosnahan, 18 Fed. 62, 64 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1883); United States v. Bell
Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224, 239 (1896); Paper Bag Patent Case, 210 U. S. 405, 424
(1907) ; Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 10 (1912).
29. Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag, 210 U. S. 405, 425-6 (1907) and
the authorities there cited.
30. CONSTiTUT oN, ART. IV, SEc. 3, par. 2.
31. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U. S. 1834) ; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 494-5
(U. S. 1850); Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 195 (U. S. 1856); Marsh v. Nichols,
Shepard & Co., 128 U. S. 605, 612 (1888); Dable Grain Shovel Co. v. Flint, 137 U. S. 41,
43 (1890).
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right to exclude disappears. Such theory of merger as to the patent
right has a possible parallel in the law of real property, by which, when
the owner of an estate subject to an easement of another estate acquires
title to the latter, the easement is extinguished.32 In analogy to the estab-
lished principle of real property, the disclosure by the owner of the
invention may be considered the dominant estate, and the common law
right to make, use, and sell a disclosed invention, the servient estate.
If the disclosure of the invention is made by the inventor in the manner
provided by the statutes enacted under the constitutional provision, a
patent results which, pursuing the analogy, is the easement enjoyed by
the dominant estate, owned by the inventor, over the servient estate,
owned by "we, the people". This patent easement may well be regarded
as a right of access to the highway of promoting the progress of science
and, the useful arts. Under the fact situation herein of interest, title
to the disclosure of the invention is now acquired by "we, the people"
through the agency of their delegate, the federal government. Title to
both the dominant and servient estates is, therefore, in the same owner,
and the easement disappears.
As hereinbefore stated, there is no common law right to exclude from
the practice of a disclosed invention, even on the part of the inventor
himself and although he himself made the disclosure. The right to ex-
clude is. purely the creation of "we, the people", who delegated this
power to the federal government. The created right to exclude has been
for one purpose only-to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. "We, the people" have not, to date, created the right that the
federal government may exclude any one from the practice of a disclosed
invention, and not having created it, certainly has not delegated that
right to the federal government. And the federal government, the dele-
gate with but limited powers from "we, the people", cannot, acting as
such delegate, so exercise its limited powers to invest itself with, and
to deprive "we, the people" of, powers which "we, the people" have
neither created nor delegated. In this connection, the holding in Kansas
v. Colorado33 is particularly in point. There the federal government
sought to intervene in a suit between the two states, claiming the right
to control the waters of the Arkansas River in the reclamation of" arid
lands. In dismissing the federal government's intervention, the court
held in respect of the federal government's contention that all powers
32. Wells v. Garbutt, 132 N. Y. 430, 30 N. E. 978 (1892); Fritz v. Tompkins, 168
N. Y. 524, 61 N. E. 893 (1901).
33. 206 U. S. 46 (1907).
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which are national in scope34 must be found vested in the federal govern-
ment:
"... all powers of a national character which are not delegated to the Na-
tional Government by the Constitution are reserved to the people of the
United States. The people who adopted the Constitution knew that in the
nature of things they could not foresee all the questions which might arise
in the future, all the circumstances which might call for the exercise of further
national powers than those granted to the United States, and after making
provision for an amendment to the Constitution by which any needed addi-
tional powers would be granted, they reserved -to themselves all powers not
so delegated." 35
Assuming for the moment that the federal government, owning a
patent, can exercise the right to exclude, it could elect not to license
any one and enjoin all infringements, even though it did not itself
use the invention. That would not be promotion of the sciences and
useful arts, but its direct opposite. Or the federal government could
sell the patent outright to whomever it pleases, perhaps some one in its
then favor and grace, on such terms or lack of terms as'it saw fit. That,
too, would not be promotion of the sciences and useful arts by the fed-
eral government, for the federal government, by the assignment of the
right to exclude, has put a private assignee in the position where he can
levy a toll on the sciences and useful arts. And the federal government
could, in the alternative, grant licenses on terms.36 No matter how
nominal the terms, the federal government would be imposing terms on
the progress, if only by the assertion that a license is required3& 7 or the
34. ". . . these incorporeal [patent] rights do not exist in any particular State or dis-
trict; they are co-extensive with the United States. There is nothing . . .in the nature
of the rights themselves to give them locality anywhere . . .limited by the lines of States
and districts." Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 447, 451 (U. S. 1854). See also Ager v.
Murray, 105 U. S. 126 (1881).
35. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 90 (1907).
36. While the Alien Property Custodian announces he will issue licenses under the
vested patents to any reputable American firm or individual, he nevertheless appears to
reserve the right to select who will, and who will not, be licensed. "These fees, payable
at the time of filing an application for license, will be returned if for any reason the
license is not granted." Aui'rN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN, op. Cit. supra note 4 at 14.
37. Although the licenses to be granted by the Alien Property Custodian are to be
royalty free (but $50.00 application fee per single patent plus $5.00 per patent for each
additional related patent in the same license is payable in advance), the fact that never-
theless such license is required, is the mildest form in which the claimed right of the
federal government to exclude the public from practicing an invention patented to the
government, can be asserted. This situation parallels that involving a statutory provision
19431
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exercise of discretion as to whom it will license."8 In any event, the
federal government could not prevent the rest of the world, outside its
jurisdiction, from freely practicing the invention disclosed in the patent.
Abroad, then, the sciences and useful arts would be free of any bar,
but within the United States they would be subject to the federal gov-
ernment's patent right.39
That the Constitution contains no express provision on the subject
of the instant inquiry is not of itself controlling, for with the Constitu-
tion, as with any written document, what is reasonably implied is as
much a part of it as what is expressed." Examining the Constitution we
find that advances in science and the useful arts might well be of some
importance or relation to the common defense, the general welfare, and
for revenue purposes, all three of which are expressly mentioned.' While
providing that, upon failure to produce books after subpoena, the government's allegations
as to their contents would be considered proven in internal revenue matters, as to which
the Supreme Court, holding the provision unconstitutional in Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S. 616 (1885) stated at 635:
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure .... It is the duty
of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachment thereon."
38. Compare also: "National policy clearly dictates that this Government should seize
and turn to the advantage of all its citizens, rights to the discoveries of our present enemies
which have been protected in this country by patents issued by an agency of this govern-
ment. Accordingly, title to United States patents and patent applications owned by the
enemy is being vested in the name of the United States Government." A=am PRoPERz
CUSTODIAN, op. cit. supra note 4 at 5. "This Government holds these patents for the use
of the people of the United States." Id. at 11. Italics added.
39. And considering 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 d(i), can the Tennessee Valley Authority, a
federal agency, elect not to license another department of the government under the patents
it is holding? The question is not highly theoretical; whether one department of the
government holding a patent could refuse to license another, department of the government
under a patent has been asked.' The Attorney-General in 31 A. G. Op. 463 (1919) avoided
answering the question on the ground it had not arisen in the administration of the in-
quiring War Department, which was contemplating the purchase of a patent on a cannon.
Furthermore, while the present Alien Property Custodian has announced he will not
sell the vested patents, there is nothing to prevent him from changing that policy, or to
prevent his successors in office from adopting a different policy. If the Alien Property
Custodian has the power to grant licenses under vested patents by the authority of the
First War Powers Act, 1941 [50 U. S. C. A. (App.) § 6161, he certainly also has the
power to liquidate, sell and otherwise deal with, the vested patent rights.
40. United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 568 (U. S. 1849); Legal Tender Cases,
12 Wall. 457, 534 (U. S. 1870); Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1883); Dillon v.
Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 373 (1920).
41. Constitution, Preamble and Art. I, Sec. 8.
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discoveries may well be of interest to each function of government, with
respect to national defense and general welfare, the interest would ap-
pear to reside in their early availability for these purposes, whereas in
relation to revenue the interest would appear to lie in the financial
profit which can be derived by making the discoveries available only
on terms.
National defense is unquestionably furthered by having available at
the earliest moment any and all advances in science capable of assistance
in defeating the enemy, while keeping knowledge of the advance from
the enemy. Where a patent has been granted in the United States, the
secrecy surrounding the invention in the form of an application for
patent is lost,, and all the world may read the invention described and
claimed in the grant. Although there is nothing in the constitutional
provision which would prevent the issuance of secret patents for instru-
ments or munitions of war, our legislators have not provided for secret
patents as has, for example, Great Britain." Inventions relating to
national defense may be made by employees of the government or by
inventors not associated with the government. On this inquiry only
those inventions owned by the federal government are of interest. Can
it be implied from the Constitution that the federal government is to
obtain patents on such inventions, when by obtaining the only type
patent known in the United States the invention is disclosed in the very
document evidencing the grant, and, in any event, gives the exclusive
right only for a limited time? It is submitted that the practical men
who framed the Constitution used no words from which effects detri-
mental to national defense could be implied; their express purpose was
to further the common defense. From these words the only implication
possible is that, as to national defense, the federal government should
resort to secrecy of the defense invention it owns. This implication has,
in fact, been recognized by the legislators in legislation' which, if
observed by the officials charged with national defense, also avoids the
possibility that the government might be subject to suit by a later, but
independent, inventor. -It is an established principle of patent law that
where the owner of an invention elects to keep the invention secret, his
prior invention will not defeat the right ,of a subsequent independent
inventor to a patent for the same invention." The federal government
42. Patents and Designs Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 29, § 30.
43. 39 STAT. 348 (1916), 35 U. S. C. A. § 37.
44. Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477 (U. S. 1850); Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 328
(U. S. 1859); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Electric Co., 246 Fed. 695 (C. C. A.
6th, 1917), cert. denied 246 U. S. 659 (1917).
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can avoid the operation of this principle against its secret defense in-
vention by filing an application for patent thereon, and preserve its
secrecy for as long a time as it sees fit by successive certifications to the
Patent Office by the defense officials, if needed for a time far in excess
of the limited time for which patents may be granted.45
Turning our attention to the words "to promote the general welfare",4"
it would appear that the public interest requires that even the most un-
known individual among the people, irrespective of his prior attain-
ments as a producer of commercial products, and no matter how limited
or extensive his resources, should have the untrammeled competitive
right to establish himself, or to continue, in such production. If, to
commence in such production or to continue therein with an improved
product, he requires an invention owned by the federal government,
what public interest is there which requires a different answer to him
depending on whether or not the invention is patented to the federal
government? At common law he can freely use any unpatented inven-
tion, irrespective of who owns it, but if there is an implied right in the
Constitution that the federal government may exercise patent rights, he
could use the invention patented to the government only by the grace
and favor of the government. Has he not, as a member of "we, the
people", the absolute right to use the invention patented to the delegate
of "we, the people", rather than having to rely on the grace and favor
of the delegate?
In support of the implied right to exclude under a patent owned by
the federal government, based on the public interest, it has been con-
tended that commercial products, made under patent license from the
45. And as to privately owned patents on inventions useful in national defense, the
federal government may use the inventions without any interference by the patentee other
than a suit for compensation in the Court of Claims, 35 U. S. C. A. § 68, 36 STAT. 851
(1910).
Pub. L. No. 768, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942, provides for the adjustment of royalties
under privately owned patents on inventions useful in the prosecution of the war, which
royalties in the government's opinion are believed unreasonable or excessive, and are
charged or chargeable, directly or indirectly, to the federal government.
For the duration of the war, Pub. L. No. 700, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942, as amended,
resorts to secrecy as to inventions by whomever owned, the publication or disclosure of
which, in the opinion of the Commissioner of Patents, might be detrimental to the public
safety or defense, and authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to withhold patents thereon
for such periods as in his opinion the national interest requires. It further permits the
filing of corresponding foreign applications for patent, on all inventions whether a secrecy
order has been issued or not, only on the express license of the Commissioner of Patents.
46. Constitution, Preamble.
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federal government, would become cheaper and more widely available
to the public. Such contention misses the point that if all the public
could freely use the invention patented to the federal government, com-
mercial products made by the use of the invention, would be even cheaper
and still more widely available. Even if the licenses granted by the gov-
ernment were free of royalty, the system of dispensing and revoking
licenses in its sole discretion acts as a bar to competition in such com-
mercial products. Many potential competitors in these products would
be deterred from engaging in the business of making and selling the
products due to the double risk added by such system. At, the outset,
they*would be subject to having the federal government pass on their
eligibility to compete, and thereafter, having been favored with the
license, they would have to run the risk that the federal government
might revoke the eligibility originally accorded.48
Our industrial life is not a new condition which was unknown to the
framers-of the Constitution. The crown's restrictions on ianufactures
and industries in the colonies, and the favoritism accorded by the crown
to industry and manufacture in England, were a contributing cause to
the Revolution. It cannot be imputed to the framers that they neglected
this factor, and its effect on their political life. They were opposed to
'all favor and grace of the crown, and can hardly have meant to institute
and create a national government which, by implication, had any power
such as that of the overthrown crown. It would appear that their failure
to delegate to the federal government any such power expressly was not
an oversight, and that the only clear implication from the lack of an
express power is the complete absence of such power in the public
interest.
The revenue power expressly delegated to the federal government is
for the purpose: "to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States".49 Spencer, discussing inven-
tions made by employees of the federal government, on its time and
47. Attorney-General Stone, 34 A. G. Op. 329 (1924).
48. "Our national economy is committed to free enterprise. . . . Among the oldest and
most cherished of our institutions is 'freedom of opportunity, an aspect of which is the
openness of occupations to all who care to take their chances. The right of a man to his
trade is among the oldest of the 'liberties' recognized by the common law. . . Whatever
the industry, a legal right to enter is of little avail unless the adventurer has access to the
industrial art." Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise, Mon. No. 31, INVESTGATION OP
CONCENTRATIONq oF EcoNomc POWER, TEMPORARY NATIONAL EcoNomc CoVm.TTEE, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1941, at 158.
49. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1.
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with its facilities, on which the employees obtain patents, title to which
is not assigned to the federal government but retained by the employees,
contends that this rather widespread practice diverts a source of sub-
stantial revenue from the federal government into the pockets of the
employees and their private assignees."° The revenue of which he treats
are the license fees collected by such employee-patent owners. If the
federal government, rather than the private patentee, were collecting
these royalty fees, it is submitted they would constitute a direct tax
on the licensee. But the Constitution is clear that direct taxes must be
apportioned among the several states,5 ' and the courts have held that
direct taxes imposed on the individual are unconstitutional.52 It is sub-
mitted that the sixteenth amendment does not alter this situation for
the royalty payable under a patent license has no relation to "incomes,
from whatever source derived".
During World War I, the federal government purchased from the
Alien Property Custodian certain patents which the Custodian had
seized from enemy owners. In certain of its activities, the government
needed licenses under other patents held by private interests. The fed-
eral government, therefore, embarked on a program of granting licenses
to these private interests under the patents so purchased, in exchange
for licenses to the federal government under the patents owned by
private interests. Basically the federal government was thus employing
its grant of licenses to the private interests as a substitute for the public
funds it would otherwise have had to expend to obtain for itself licenses
from the private interests.53 A former Commissioner of Patents con-
cluded as to this that the federal government was without power to so
grant licenses, and had "nothing to give" to the private interests for
the license it received.54
The courts have held that a patent is a contract to be construed by
the same principles that control .the construction of all contracts; that
the consideration given by the inventor in the patent contract is his
disclosure of the invention, and that of the federal government, the
50. SPENCER, THE UN ITED STATES PATENT LAW SYSTEM (Chicago, 1931) 40.
51. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 3.
52. Hylton v. United States, 3 Dallas 171 (U. S. 1796); Pollack v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
53. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827); Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S. 616, 635 (1885); Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688 (1895); Fair-
bank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283 (1901).
54. Ewing, Government Owned Patents (1928) 10 JoURNAL op T= PAT. OFr. Soc.
149-156.
[Vol. 12
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF PATENTS
grant of the right to exclude for a limited time; 55 and that where the
disclosure of the invention on the patent is not complete, the contract
collapses and the patent is void. 6 It is fundamental to the law of con-
tracts that a party cannot contract with himself, there must be at least
two parties to a contract.57 Where an inventor files his application for
patent on his invention, he negotiates with the federal government in
the formulation of the contract. If such an inventor, as the result of
his employment or other agreement, is obligated to assign his invention
and the patent thereon to the federal government, the situation is thus
that the federal government, either directly or through the inventor on
its behalf, is negotiating a contract with the federal government. In
such a situation, no valid contract can result.
The only other fact situation possible, is that the patent is granted to
the inventor or to his non-government assignee, and thereafter the issued
patent, by purchase, devise, gift or vesting, becomes the property of the
federal government. Originally there were two parties to the patent
contract, the inventor and the federal government. Now, there is only
one, the federal government, which has become repossessed of its grant
of the right to exclude from the invention. Under a general principle
of contract law, where a contractual promise again becomes the property
of the promisor, the promise disappears. 8 It is submitted that there-
fore in the patent contract, owned by the federal government, the right
to exclude from the invention, the promise of the federal government
in the patent contract, has disappeared.
Discussion of the instant problem by the text writers has been de-
cidedly limited. Most of the published views, with one exception, incline
to the view that the federal government can exercise the right to exclude
under patents to which it has legal title. Spencer, discussing the shop
right accorded the federal government under inventions made by govern-
ment employees, emphasizes the loss of revenue to the federal govern-
55. Century Electric Co. v. Westinghouse E. & Mfg. Co., 191 Fed. 350, 354 (C. C. A.
8th, 1911); Fried. Krupp A-G v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 Fed. 588, 594 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911),
cert. denied 233 U. S. 728 (1913); Tompkins-Hawley-Fuller Co. v. Holden, 273 Fed. 424,
430 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
56. Jensen-Salsery Lab. Inc. v. 0. M. Franklin, B. S. Co., 74 F. (2d) 501, 509 (C. C. A.
10th, 1934); The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U. S. 465, 474 (1895); General Electric
v. Wabash, 304 U. S. 364, 372 (1938).
57. In re State Exchange Bank of Stryker, 26 Ohio App. 142, 199 N. E. 839 (1927);
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Long, 139 Kan. 632, 32 P. (2d) 464 (1934); 17 C. J. S. 356-7;
REsTATE~mNT, CONTRACTrS, § 15.
58. Persky v. Bank of America Nat. Assn., 261 N. Y. 212, 219, 185 N. E. 77, 79 (1933).
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ment by such system. He does not go into the matter of whether there
is any constitutional authority in the federal government enabling it
to exercise the right to exclude for revenue purposes. While he makes
the statement that "no valid objection exists to conferring upon the
government the right to hold patents . . . and bring suit", 9 he appears
to find some difficulty with the otherwise unsupported proposal he
makes, for he adds directly, "so long as a provision is included which
will be effective to prevent the government from entering into strenuous
business competition with private individuals. . . . The authority to
grant exclusive licenses is, however, too despotic and all too subject to
misuse and abuse in application to be put in the hands of the govern-
ment. . . ,"o It would seem that he uses the term "patent" in a mean-
ing differing from that accorded it under our existing law, and that
what he is prepared to have the government empowered to hold and
enforce is a right limited in such a way that it is not assignable by the
federal government, will not authorize government to compete with
private business, and will not enable the federal government to grant
an exclusive portion of that right to any one.
Broder, 61 conceding that the Constitution makes no mention of the
power of the federal government to hold patent rights, is of the view:
"aside from the question of constitutionality, there appears no logical
reason why it cannot hold or own the grant outright."62 He does not
discuss the constitutional question, and fails to consider the two objec-
tions mentioned by Spencer, competition with private business and ex-
clusive licenses. Where the federal government buys a patent, Broder
sees no practical or legalistic reason why the federal government cannot
bar others from the use of the invention, but reveals he is none too cer-
tain in this, by continuing: "The apparent right to hold title to such
patents becomes, perhaps, more attenuated as the subject matter cov-
ered therein diverges from the fields wherein the Federal Government
has jurisdiction. 0 3 He does not identify the fields of federal jurisdic-
tion, and discusses neither the nature of the federal government nor
the character of patent rights. While leaving the final decision of the
main question to the courts, he feels that "from the point of view of
59. Spencer, op. cit. supra, note 50 at 40.
60. Id. at 41.
61. Broder, Government Ownership of Patents (1936) 18 JoURaAL OF THE PAT. OFF.
Soc. 697.
62. Id. at 699.
63. Id. at 700.
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consistent procedure and ultimate benefit, the school of thought that
maintains the right of the Government to deal in patents seems to be
the more reasonable."'0 4 No reasons are set forth why the ultimate
benefit is preferable to presently, and at the earliest moment, having
the public participate in the progress of science and the useful arts made
or controlled by the government.
Similarly, Howell" states: "There is nothing in the law to prevent
the Government from receiving a copyright by purchase or gift and
holding it as proprietor". He does not further develop the statement,
and it is probable by "law" he means statutes for he makes the statement
after referring to the statutory provision that there is no copyright in
publications of the federal government.
The only writer that comes to the conclusion that the government
has nothing to give by way of a license under a federal government
owned patent is Ewing,"' a former Commissioner of Patents. He bases
his conclusions not only on the constitutional limitations, but also on the
ground that the federal government cannot confer rights upon itself
by its own grants. He relies extensively on Thomas Paine, whose argu-
ments, contemporaneous with the Constitution, were successfully pre-
sented against the claims of Virginia to certain lands. Paine's arguments
were based on the proposition that when the patent for the land in ques-
tion returned to the Crown which had granted it, the patent ceased to
exist insofar as any government right or power was concerned, and hence
the land belonged not to Virginia but to the United States for the benefit
of all.
The subject matter of the instant inquiry has, within the last twenty
years, been considered by the Attorneys-General of the United States,
on two occasions directly and on several occasions indirectly. For a
full understanding of their views, a chronological treatment appears
advisable. The first of the line of opinions was rendered by Attorney-
General Stone on October 28, 1924,67 in answer to the inquiry whether
the Secretary of the Navy could grant licenses under federally owned
patents in exchange for licenses by private interests to the federal gov-
ernment. This is the identical situation as to which Ewing, as above
mentioned, concluded the federal government had nothing to give. The
Attorney-General being "unable to find in the law any direct, specific
64. Id. at 708.
65. HOwELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW (Washington, 1942) 40n.
66. Cf. Ewing, loc. cit. supra note 54.
67. Cf. 34 A. G. Op. 320.
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statutory grant of authority to one of the Executive Departments to
alienate any of the patent rights acquired by the United States or any
of its Departments, or to in any way encumber the same or grant privi-
leges in connection therewith",68 turned to the practice of the executive
departments in respect of federal government real property for guidance.
Holding that the practice, under which the executive departments grant-
ed to private interests temporary and revocable permits to use federally
owned real property, was well established, and pointing out that the
holder of a non-exclusive and revocable license under a patent on an
invention had not as much interest in the property licensed to him as
had a tenant at sufferance in realty, he concluded that the Secretary of
the Navy could, in the public interest, grant non-exclusive, non-trans-
ferable and revocable licenses under patents owned by the federal gov-
ernment. He supported the public interest in these words:
"As the Government does not itself manufacture for sale or disposition the
devices covered by the patent which are for Government use alone if it
grants no license under the patents owned by it, the invention is practically
buried and unavailable for the life of the patent, the public is deprived of
the advantage of the invention, and so the object of the Constitutional provi-
sion is substantially nullified or evaded with no consequent advantage to the
Government but distinct loss because of the greater cost of the restricted article
both to the Government and eventually the public, because the wider the
field and the greater the production, the cheaper the article. In other words,
the granting of a license tends to further the intent of the Constitutional
provision while the burying of the patent, which is the effect of a failure to
manufacture and sell or license others so to do-eviscerates it."6 9
Some nine years later, the question whether the government could issue
licenses to private interests for non-governmental purposes under patents
owned by the government, was resubmitted. The Attorney-General, on
July 11, 1933, 70 again was of the view that the federal government
could grant such licenses, relying wholly on the Stone opinion of Octo-
ber 28, 1924.
Whether upon an assignment of a patent to the United States, the
invention thereof was dedicated to the general public or became the ex-
clusive property of the federal government, empowering the latter to
exclude the general public from the invention, was answered on March 9,
68. Id. at 323.
69. Id. at 329.
70. Attorney-General Cummings, 37 A. G. Op. 180 (1933).
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1936. 71 The Attorney-General, holding there was no dedication of the
invention to the public, based his conclusion on the Stone opinion of
October 28, 1924, reasoning that: "The issuance of such licenses is con-
sistent only with the view that there is no authority for private persons
to use inventions covered by government-owned patents in the absence
of a license."12
To the date of writing, there have been two additional opinions by the
Attorney-General, both of which are based on, the Stone opinion and
cite no additional authority. The opinion of November 2, 1936,7' con-
cludes that revocable, non-exclusive and non-transferable licenses may
be granted under a government owned patent, free of royalty if the
license is in the public interest, but for a consideration if there be no
public interest. The opinion of May 10, 1938,7" held that an assignment
of a patent to the United States did not result in a dedication of the
invention to the public.
From the foregoing, it will be noted that the entire line of opinions
of the Attorneys-General are based on the Stone opinion. In this opinion
patent rights are considered wholly in the light of practices in govern-
ment owned real property. No consideration is accorded the fact that
patent rights are the creation of the federal government itself, and upon
the assignment of patent rights to the federal government, these created
rights have returned to their creator. While the opinion relies on real
property law and applies it to patent rights, the rule of real property
applicable when titles to both a dominant and servient tenement are
joined in the same owner, was, however, neither mentioned nor applied in
the consideration of the patent rights. It is submitted that, if reasoning
as to patent rights is to be carried over from the law of real property, all
the pertinent, principles of real property law merit application. The
views of the Attorney-General would seem to be based upon less than all
the pertinent facts, and hence the weight to be accorded them appears
questionable.
It will be recalled that the opinions of the Attorney-General are
treated by the courts much the same way as are established practices
of executive departments charged with enforcing a particular statute
or constitutional provision. 5 He is not a judicial officer but rather an
71. Attorney-General Reed, 38 A. G. Op. 425 (1936).
72. Id. at 427.
73. Acting Attorney-General Bell, 38 A. G. Op. 534 (1936).
74. Attorney-General Cummings, 39 A. G. Op. 164 (1938).
75. 'Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 308 (1901); The Propeller Genesee Chief
v. Fitzhugh, 12 H6w. 443 (U. S. 1851).
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officer of the executive branch of the government, whose views as to
law are to be accorded such deference as is given to the opinion of other
able persons learned in the law, and no more.76 As appears from the
reported cases located, his opinions have been disregarded by the courts
about as often as followed.77 In the only reported instance of an opinion
on patent matters, Squier v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,78
his opinion was not followed by the court. Here the patentee-plaintiff
had secured a patent on his invention under the provisions of the Act
of March 3, 1883, and sued for infringement based upon a non-govern-
mental use. The Act provided for fee-less patents on the applications
for patent on inventions by government employees, providing the govern-
ment employee agreed that the patented inventions might be used royalty
free by the government, its officers, "or by any other person in the United
States". In the opinion of March 22, 1920, the Attorney-General con-
struing the Act, stated:
"It is my opinion that when a patent issues under the provisions of this
Act no dedication to the public results, but that any person in the United
States, including governmental officers and employees, may use the invention
disclosed in the patent without the payment of royalty provided the use be
in the prosecution of work for the federal government."79
Finding for the defendant, District Judge Knox held: "there is no good
reason to doubt that the statute under consideration means exactly
what its words, as they appear and are arranged, declare." 0 He pointed
out that neither in the Attorney's-General opinion of March 22, 1920,
nor in an earlier opinion by the Judge Advocate of the Army, whose
views were the same as those of the Attorney-General, was there any
76. McDonald v. United States, 89 F. (2d) 128, 135 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937), cert. denied
301 U. S. 697 (1937).
77. Eight reported decisions in which opinion by the Attorney-General have been dis-
cussed by the court have been located in an extensive search; however, no claim is made
that the list necessarily exhausts the decisions. Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How. 48 (U. S. 1850)
Harrison v. Vose, 9 How. 372 (U. S. 1850); United States v. Falk, 204 U. S. 143 (1907);
Envin v. United States, 37 Fed. 470, 474 (D. C. Ga. 1889); Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat.
543, 549 (U. S. 1823); Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (1913); Squier v.
Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 7 F. (2d) 831 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert. denied 269 U. S. 567 (1925);
McDonald v. United States, 89 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937), cert. denied 301 U. S.
697 (1937).
78. 21 F. (2d) 747 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1924), affirmed 7 F. (2d) 831, cert. denied 269
U. S. 567 (1925).
79. Acting Attorney-General Ames, 32 A. G. Op. 145 (1920).
80. Squier v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 F. (2d) 747, 751.
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mention of the practice of the Patent Office marking the legend: "Dedi-
cated to the Public", on the face of patents issued under the Act. Judge
Knox went on to say: "While their arguments have some element of
appeal, I find myself unable to adopt their conclusion." 81 The Circuit
Court of Appeals in affirming did not find it necessary to affirmance to
pass on the Attorney's-General opinion, but did state that if such were
necessary, the 'court would prefer the 1910 opinion of the Judge Advo-
cate to the effect that the Act did result in a dedication to the public.
The continued practice by the executive departments of granting non-
exclusive, non-transferable, and revocable licenses under patents owned
by the federal goverment, is not such a practical construction as to be
decisive of the power of the federal government to exercise patent tights.
The patent right is not the exclusion of others from making, using and
selling an invention, but the right to exclude others. -A license under
the patent right is the waiver of the right to exclude as to the particular
licensee carrying with it no affirmative right to make, use and sell the
invention. The licensee may, notwithstanding his license under a patent,
still not be in a position to make, use and sell the invention because
the contemplated embodiment may involve the use of the earlier patent
of a different inventor upon the broader and more basic invention. The
patent license thus differs from a license to real property, for example,
which not only waives actual exclusion from the realty but grants the
affirmative right to use the realty.82 There has not been a single instance
in which the federal government ever enforced, or attempted to en-
force, 8 the right to exclude under a patent.8 " The fact that the federal
government has merely waived suit 5 against a number of licensees
under patents it owns is, therefore, not determinative of whether the
81. Ibid.
82. The form of license by the Alien Property Custodian (A. P. C. 30, Feb. 1943)
would appear to be based on the theory that a non-exclusive and non-transferable license
under a patent conveys some affirmative right to the licensee. In Section 1, Extent of
Grant, of such license, it is provided that the license may not be pledged or encumbered.
It is difficult to see how one, against whom a right of action or suit has been waived, can
do anything to encumber or pledge the waiver running to him.
83. Attorney-General Reed, 38 A. G. Op. 425, 428 (1936).
84. In this connection, note also the administrative 'regulation of the Department of
Agriculture, providing that inventions by employees "will be patented in the name of the
inventor without expense to him, in such a way as to allow any citizen of the United
States to use the patented article or process without payment of royalties." Selden Co. v.
National Aniline & Chemical Co., 48 F. (2d) 270, 272 (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1930).
85. "(A license under a patent) ...has been described as a mere waiver of the right
to sue by the patentee." Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 24 (1912).
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federal government actually has any patent right it can enforce. Sig-
nificantly none of the licenses under patents granted by the federal
government, in so far as known, ever involved the payment of royalties
by the licensee; they have all been royalty free. The licensees may well
have believed there was a competitive advantage in publicizing that
they were licensed by the federal government and in so marking their
products. 6
Turning now to what the Courts have said on the subject of the
instant inquiry, it is repeated that there is no decision one way or the
other on the merits of the subject. The case of United States v. Hough-
tons7 involved inventions made by a government employee during gov-
ernment time and with the use of government facilities. The inventor
filed applications for patent but did not proceed under the Act of
March 3, 1883. He then offered the government a royalty free license
for the life of the patents for governmental purposes only. The govern-
ment, not content with this offer, brought suit to compel the inventor
to assign to it the entire right, title and interest in the inventions and
the patents thereon. The court, applying the rule that where an em-
ployee is hired to invent the invention belongs to the employer, found
for the government. The case did not involve the question of the effects
of assignment of patent rights to the federal government, and yet the
affirming court said:
"The Public Health Service represents the people of the United States. Its
interest is their interest; Its investigations are made for their benefit. And
although neither it nor they have any interest in monopolizing inventions which
may be made in the course of its studies and experiments, both have an interest
in seeing that these inventions are not monopolized by anyone. In the case
of the fumigant gas developed by the defendant while employed and paid by
the government to develop it, they are interested not only in the use which
the Health Service itself may make of it but also and primarily in having it
supplied to the public as freely and cheaply as possible. It is unthinkable
that, where a valuable instrument in the war against disease is developed by
a public agency through the use of public funds, the public servants employed
in its production should be allowed to monopolize it for private gain and levy
a tribute upon the public which has paid for its production, upon merely grant-
86. The form of license by the Alien Property Custodian requires patent marking by
the licensee in compliance with Rev. Stat. 4900 (1870), 35 U. S. C. A. § 49, and in addi-
tion permits the licensee to add a further notice "Licensed by the Alien Property Cus-
todian", or the abbreviation "Lic. APC". A.P.C. 30 (Feb. 1943) Sec. 4.
87. 20 F. (2d) 434, affirmed 23 F. (2d) 386, cert. denied 277 U. S. 592 (1928).
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ing a non-exclusive license for its use to the governmental department in
which they are employed."88
It is to be particularly noted that the court makes no exception in
favor of the federal government in its statement "that these inventions
are not monopolized by anyone." The language, it is submitted, applies
with equal force to any and all patents title to which is in the United
States. As the court indicates, a license to the federal government to
use the patented inventions for its governmental purposes is all the
government really needs for its own activities. But the government's
obligation does not end there; not only has the government no interest
in itself monopolizing the inventions it owns, it has also the duty to
see that no one else monopolizes them. 9 Although not expressly men-
tioning the federal government's obligation to promote the progress of
a science and the useful arts, this language is some evidence of the con-
viction of the court that the federal government has no power to ex-
clude from the practice of an invention disclosed in a patent to which
it holds legal title.
In United States v. Dubilier,° inventions were made by government
employees of the Bureau of Standards and the patents thereon assigned
to the defendant corporation. The United States sought a declaration
that the defendant held the patents in trust for the government and be
required to assign them to the government. The majority of the court
held that as the employee-inventors were not employed by the govern-
ment to invent, the government was confined to a shop-right under the
inventions. Like many decisions, the majority opinion contained some
passages not directly pertinent to the holding. In the original decision
as reported there appeared the following paragraph:
"Moreover, no court could, however clear the proof of such a contract,
order the execution of an assignment. No act of Congress has been called
to our attention authorizing the United States to take a patent or to hold one
by assignment. No statutory authority exists for the transfer of a patent to
any department or officer of the government, or for the administration of
patents, or the issuance of licenses on behalf of the United States. In these
88. 23 F. (2d) 386, 391.
89. ". . . the conclusion that it is the patentee upon whom falls the duty of promoting
of science and the useful arts . .. is plain foolishness. The Constitution expressly states
that it is Congress that is to promote the progress of science and the useful arts."
(Italics in original.) Ballard, Patents and Free Enterprise, (1941) 20 BELL TELEPHONE
MAGAZINE 243, 249, quoted in FoLc, op. cit. supra note 22, at 85.
90. 289 U. S. 178 (1933).
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circumstances no public policy requires us to deprive the inventor of his
exclusive rights as respects the general public and to lodge them in a dead
hand incapable of turning the patent to account for the benefit of the public."
About a month after the original decision was rendered, a unique and
startling thing occurred, which is a most unusual disposition of obiter
contained in a decision. The paragraph was on motion of the Solicitor-
General of the United States eliminated from the report of the decision. 91
The two dissenting opinions in this case are, however, of interest
on the instant inquiry. The dissenting Justices, viewing the facts as
requiring a holding that title to the inventions and the patents thereon
was in the United States, discussed the subject matter of this inquiry.
In the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Stone, in which Mr. Justice
Cardozo joined, is stated:
". .. It is a difficult question which has been the subject of consideration
at least since the war, whether the public interest is best served by the dedi-
cation of an invention to the public or by its exploitation with patent pro-
tection under license from the government or the inventor. But the difficulty
of resolving the question does not justify a decree which does answer it in
favor of permitting government employees such as these to exploit their in-
ventions without restriction, rather than one which would require the can-
cellation of their patents or their assignment to the United States. The decrees
should be reversed." '0 2
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, also dissenting, concluded:
"As the people of the United States should have the unrestricted use of
the inventions in such a case, I think that the appropriate remedy would be
to cancel the patents." 3
All of the dissenting Justices thus shared the view that where title to
a patent was to be assigned to the federal government, such assignment
differed from an assignmeit to a non-government party. In an assign-
ment to a private party, while the patent rights are divested from the
assignor, there is never any question that the patent rights are, or may
be, cancelled-they are always vested in the assignee. But where, as
here, the government is the potential assignee, the Chief Justice holds
there is a cancellation of the patent rights, while Justices Stone and
Cardozo hold there may be a cancellation of the patent rights. It is
submitted that the inference from these remarks of the three Justices
91. Id. at 706.
92. Id. at 222 (Italics added).
93. Id. at 224 (Italics added).
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is that they hold the view that an assignment of a patent to the federal
government amounts to a dedication of the invention of the patent to
the public. In any event, it is to be particularly noted that the whole
line of opinions by the Attorneys-General, hereinabove mentioned, is
based upon the opinion,94 written while he was Attorney-General, by
the very Supreme Court Justice who, nine years thereafter and with
the benefit of additional experience with patent law, placed assignment
of a patent to the federal government in the same category as, if not
the actual equivalent of, the cancellation of the patent.
By way of summary, it is concluded:
a. The Constitutional provision is clear, certain, and unambiguous
that Congress has the duty and obligation to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts;
b. The Constitution neither delegates nor implies power in the fed-
eral government to exclude any one from making, using or vending
an invention disclosed in a patent, legal title to which is in the
federal government; but the Constitution does imply the complete
absence of such power;
c. There is no right to exclude from making, using and vending a
disclosed invention at common law; the power to create the right
is in "we, the people" and has been exercised to date only for the
purpose of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts;
d. The progress of science and the useful arts is not promoted by
the federal government exercising a right t6 exclude from the
practice of a disclosed invention owned by the federal government,
but on the contrary is thereby delayed, impeded, and negatived;
e. Title to a patent in the federal government is the cancellation of
all patent rights, and reduces the patent document to a publication
of the invention therein described; and
f. The common law right to make, use, and vend a disclosed- inven-
tion, perfected or owned by the federal government, and patented
to the federal government, requires nothing further in aid of the
right.
94. Cf. note 47, supra.
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